

**Chapter Two of Dharmakirti's *Pramanavarttika*  
Advanced Buddhist Philosophy Course – Term 5**

**Class 9 - 2016 October 12 –Wednesday<sup>1</sup> - 20161012C09T1.mp3 & 20161012C09T2.mp3**

Institute for Buddhist Dialectics, McLeod Ganj, India

Teacher - GESHE KELSANG WANGMO

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**REVIEW - HOW DOES CONSCIOUSNESS ARISE?**

**What cause must always be there?**

GESHE WANGMO: How does consciousness arise. We talk about causes and effects. Something arises from a cause. Then how does consciousness arise? What cause must always be present for a consciousness to arise? There's always one thing that needs to be there.

STUDENT: An object.

GESHE WANGMO: A cause. Is an object of a mind always the cause of that mind? Every mind always has an object, always has content; is always aware. But does that something have to be the cause of consciousness. There is a cause that must precede the awareness. If you think of something, but it always precede the consciousness? No, you can think of tomorrow; so *tomorrow* doesn't have to precede consciousness. You can make a plan, tomorrow, I'll drive to D'asala. If you do so, then it actually takes place tomorrow. Planning tomorrow is taken to mind today, but happens tomorrow; so it is an object, but not a cause of the awareness.

What is it that must always precede an awareness?

STUDENT: A former moment of consciousness.

GESHE WANGMO: Yes, otherwise, the current moment couldn't perceive its object. Like an atom, you must have physical preceding.

This is true of every type of consciousness, sense or not. I'm not saying, for my consciousness to arise now, it cannot be preceded by an awareness in someone else's continuum; must be in my own.

If I have a mental consciousness now, does that have to be preceded immediately before by a mental consciousness. What about a sense consciousness, does it have to be preceded by a sense consciousness.

Is there a sense consciousness in the continuum of a person that is not immediately preceded by another sense consciousness. Can you think of an eye consciousness that is not immediately preceded by an eye consciousness?

RENY: When you open your eyes in the morning.

GESHE WANGMO: Correct, they're . . .



Is there a moment in time when you have a first moment of mental consciousness, when you didn't have a preceding moment of mental consciousness.

STUDENT: When you faint.

GESHE WANGMO: So you have no preceding mental consciousness? But I gave you the distinction in assertion of Tantra and sutra. So when I said every consciousness has to be preceded by a consciousness; I didn't say, "Immediately preceded."

So I think the easier explanation is the tantric explanation (not saying tantra is easier) and more complete; because there's always mental consciousness. When we're asleep or fainted, there aren't coarse consciousnesses, but tantra explains subtler mental consciousness. There are no subtle sense consciousnesses. So as Reny said, that first morning moment of eye consciousness when you open eyes . . . but the Prasangika Madhyamika (Consequentialist Middle Way) doesn't talk about subtle consciousness, they'd say when you faint, no consciousness at all; but that's okay. While Sautantrika assert, no, no, you must have mental consciousness at all times, because the consciousness is the basis of the person.

Even if you don't remember all of the details; at least it makes sense in that moment.

No matter which system you fall, if I have a consciousness right now, there must have been preceding consciousness; that's true in general.

The sense consciousnesses are more specific. It is very difficult in Prasangika Madhyamika (Consequentialist Middle Way): If we say in Prasangika Madhyamika (Consequentialist Middle Way), you can have times when you have no mental consciousnesses and no sense consciousnesses, then you have no immediately preceding consciousness. When you faint, the first moment of waking up, from your faint, either the first moment must be a mental consciousness, and then the next moment you have sense consciousness; that's okay. Because a sense consciousness must always have an immediately preceding condition of another awareness. So that's the only way to get around having times when there's no consciousness. Since . . . doesn't have to be immediately preceding condition for a mental consciousness to arise; because it doesn't totally disappear; it just lies dormant so there's the potential for it to arise again.

But for sense consciousness, they must have immediately preceding condition. So the problem with fainting is solved by a mental consciousness arising before a sense consciousness/

What about an eye consciousness perceiving a table: It requires a table, an eye consciousness.

VEN. YANGCHEN: Light.

GESHE WANGMO: That's true but you can see something without light.

So those three, if I see a table now, those three must have preceded. Each performs its own function. The immediately preceding condition allows the eye consciousness to do what?

STUDENT: Perceive shapes and color.

GESHE WANGMO: That's close but not exact. When I edit the text again, I'll make it more obvious.

. . . it is easiest to understand by presenting the third requirement first. Here I explain external condition, the physical basis of sense perception, and the consciousness. Each of those perform specific function. A cause is something that gives rise to a result.

The eye consciousness perceiving the table is the result. Those three, the object, the sense power and preceding awareness all give rise to the eye consciousness; and they give rise to specific abilities of the eye consciousness.

It's the same for us: if we think of all the innumerable causes and conditions that make us now. Think of a few: our parents who are cause for us being able to talk and for our body; our teachers are responsible for our knowing arithmetic. H.H. Dalai Lama who may lead to us not getting as angry as fast.

So the . . . gives the eye consciousness the ability to "perceive"; the immediately preceding condition makes it possible for the eye consciousness to be luminous, so that something can appear to it; and for the eye consciousness to perceive that thing.

You cannot be aware of something or experience something if you didn't do so a moment earlier, and a moment earlier, etc.

VEN. YANGCHEN: We need to have the concept of a table in order to know table.

GESHE WANGMO: Yes, but let's just keep it simple; assume we know what a table is; for us to perceive a table right now.

We need an immediately preceding condition to be aware. What does the sense power enable us to do?

STUDENT: To reflect.

GESHE WANGMO: Just the eye sense power, the physical enabler of our perceiving the object. Being able to perceive shape and color.

The Eye sense power enables us to perceive shape and color. The ear consciousness is preceded by a former consciousness that enable it to be aware; and the ear sense power enables us to perceive sound.

What is the function of the table; what does the enable us to do. That's the hardest. The table doesn't do anything.

VEN. YANGCHEN: it activates or starts the process of perceiving.

GESHE WANGMO: You're right, but what does it say in the text. What is the table responsible for?

STUDENT: It's the cause of the consciousness.

STUDENT: It's the empowering condition.

GESHE WANGMO: It enables the mind to take on the aspect of the table; that is the specific function the table performs. It is responsible for an appearance of table. It kind of seems as though the table doesn't do anything. It's not easy to understand.

When some opponents set forth this discussion. It's not easy to understand that before I look at the table, my back is to it, the table is not the cause of my eye consciousness. When I look at it, for a split second, I turn around, there's a short moment when I see it but am not aware of it. It appears to the eye sense power, those two meet, but it hasn't registered yet; and a moment later, there's an eye consciousness aware of table. In that split second, that table is the cause of my eye consciousness, that table is producing my eye consciousness. It has no motivation to do so; and still it doesn't so.

We say this is the cause; it assists my eye consciousness; it enables my eye consciousness to have an appearance of table; only because of the table can I have an appearance of table.

STUDENT: Can you perceive more than one object at a time.

GESHE WANGMO: You're right, it's difficult to say how many objects you can perceive. Looking at a beautiful picture, there are many things perceived.

STUDENT: Would your mind be focused on only one object at one time or swift very quickly.

GESHE WANGMO: I think you can't take on the entire object at once, but how many at one time, I can't say. With one eye consciousness can perceive a table and a chair or is there very fast alternation. That's another debate.

AIDAN: Back to light. The light rays hit the retina. Can there be an eye consciousness without light?

GESHE WANGMO: When we say we see something, that is just imputed or labelled. Whatever the eye consciousness registers or perceives, when you open your eye in a dark room, you see darkness. The eye consciousness registers what is in front of it; whatever is in front of the eye sense power appears to the eye consciousness.

Even when we talk about light, the scientific explanation makes everything more complicated. The Buddhist says this book cover is blue . . .

But that darkness leads to an experience. Say you were in a room that is totally dark whatever your eye consciousness perceives, we call that darkness.

AIDAN: Is that the same with silence.

GESHE WANGMO: Yes, your ear consciousness is aware of no sound, and we call that silence.

. . . they would even define that as color; though in a different context you wouldn't.

VEN. PHUNTSOK: Other texts assert a fourth condition: a causal condition; I learned it at Puhlahari that way.

GESHE WANGMO: What is the causal condition.

VEN. PHUNTSOK: That's exactly my question.

GESHE WANGMO: Can you find it in the text? So Ven. Phuntsok is referring to a text that speaks of three conditions.

This is different. Just a minute. This is from point of view of the Mind Only school. Here they talk about the Mind Basis of All; they call that a causal condition; and they wouldn't accept the other three as actual causes. Because the Mind Only school says, we're like in a dream, the object and the mind arise together.

VEN. PHUNTSOK: So then, . . .

GESHE WANGMO: Yes. As I said in Mind Only, they don't say that the observed object condition is a condition - some use it and some don't. they do in this text, but say that it . . . you have the Mind Basis of All which holds all the karmic imprints which are the cause of our perception of external objects.

Going back to this point, we made before: What is a cause and what is not a cause? When we say the preceding condition . . . okay, but the table gives rise? That's harder to understand?

The easiest way to understand it is by means of imputation: phenomena are merely imputed. From the side of the object, the table in and of itself has no characteristics; the table, in and of itself, is not a table; it is only a table because we call it a table.

When you try to explain the change of the table only by talking of the table; that's impossible: you have to speak of different moments of time, earlier and later. Those moments make up the table.

When you speak of the size of the table, you have to talk about something other than the table, its surface, etc. If you only talk about the table, itself, there's no table.

. . . it doesn't mean that the object itself is running around and pushing the eye consciousness. We feel something must come from the side of the object; that's why I think it's difficult to understand that the table is a cause when I look at it and not a cause when I don't. We have the sense it doesn't do anything; and that's the sense of those whom Dharmakirti is debating.

They say whether or not you look at the table, it is the cause of the eye consciousness. Whether I look at it or not, it's the same table. Sure the atoms change, but it doesn't change from being a silent table and the next moment it throws an image or aspect of itself.

So the philosophers Dharmakirti is debating say: the table is always a cause of the eye consciousness whether or not you look at it because whether or not you do so, it's the same table. So since the table I look at is a cause and therefore the one I don't look at is a cause.

They don't deny that the atoms/molecules change. They say that although it is changing at molecular level, there's no way we can differentiate those tables.

They are saying that the momentary change is so subtle that it throws a different aspect to the eye consciousness.

Let me give you another example. You want to climb over a wall; one moment, I don't assist you and in the next moment, I actively assist you. Then I am the cause of you being able to climb the wall.

The way Buddhism talks of cause, it is something that assist the arousal of a result. For assistance, I'm actively doing something from one moment to the next. My consciousness is changing momentarily to such a degree that I have an eye consciousness.

The table doesn't do anything that . . . whether

The Kelsang Wangmo who assists Aidan and the Kelsang Wangmo who doesn't are very different. Or regarding the eye sense power, like the retina to which the table appears and the one to which it doesn't appear are very different; it's almost like photographic paper. In that way the eye sense power a moment earlier is different from the later moment when the image on the back of the retina becomes cause for the eye consciousness to arise a moment later. So there's a difference from moment to moment.

But the table, how can we say, it just sits there very still, how come this table is the cause of my eye consciousness. Even though it changes, there's nothing from the side of the object that changes so drastically to say it is a cause; so that is just imputed, that it is assisting my eye consciousness even though it isn't actively do something. On the basis of that I label cause of eye consciousness of table.

If I just stand that without at least giving verbal encouragement, I wouldn't be assisting; unless he wanted to get away from him - then I'd be a cause. Just by my standing there, I'm not doing anything; and he wants to get away, so he jumps over the wall. We'd feel I didn't assist Aidan in jumping over the wall, so I wouldn't be a cause.

NHAN VO: When . . . somehow the consciousness tries to . . .

GESHE WANGMO: I totally agree. This is the eye and . . . hits is the object; something is reflected in the eye. The blue cover doesn't do anything . . .

NHAN VO: This causes a problem when you perceive a rope as a snake; it's the same way.

GESHE WANGMO: Okay, we'll come to that in a moment. We talk about a clear perception of the eye consciousness; and if it's not clear, it is possible for it to be mistaken. We'll talk about that shortly.

## **Dependence & Causation & Imputation**

VEN. PHUNTSOK: You tried to qualify the moment when the soil starts to become a cause of sprout; so we identified proximity to the seed . . .

GESHE WANGMO: That's right. Remember the soil. Soil that doesn't have a seed in it. Then you add a seed to it. The soil didn't do anything activity. Ven. Ngawang Drolkar said the soil has changed because now it is soil in close proximity - so that is

now one of its attributes even though it didn't do anything; because things are interdependent.

I'm dependent on Todd; we're all dependent on Todd. I'm not talking about him being the Umze.

STUDENT: He opens the door.

GESHE WANGMO: There's another way. You're all dependent on someone I don't know in Alaska; why?

VEN. PHUNTSOK: Being not that person.

GESHE WANGMO: I'm not Reny. That's Reny; without Reny; I couldn't be different from Reny. Per Je Rinpoche's *Ocean of Reasoning*, the lower schools are limited in their discussion of interdependence:

- They say a result is dependent on a cause; but a cause isn't dependent on a result.
- We say, we depend on Todd to open the door. Likewise, Todd depends on us. The sprout depends on the seed; and the seed depends on the sprout, in order to be a cause.

Although Reny and I don't have a cause and effect relationship; she doesn't have to precede me or vice versa; and I'm not a part of her. But still we depend on each other, because she's different from me; that's one of her attributes; I'm different from her, that's one of my attributes: for me to be different from her, I need her.

One of my characteristics depends on her. If one of my characteristics depends on her, I depend on her. For me to depend on her is only possible if something other than me depends on her. If I depend for my survival on someone, that's because my survival is not me.

I cannot see Eris without seeing something other than Eris? I see his body or face, they aren't Eris. In order to depend on Eris, I have to depend on something other than Eris.

This is Prasangika Madhyamika (Consequentialist Middle Way); it goes really subtle.

But there's one general rule: if I can say anything about me, say, if I am walking that is only because of my legs walking. If I say "I write", that depends on my hand writing. That's why I am only imputed, only designated.

My quality of being different from Reny, depends on Reny as I'm only imputed. Therefore, I depend on Reny.

### Q&A - 20161012C09T2.mp3

GESHE WANGMO: I know you had a question.

STUDENT: Which consciousness recognizes that this object is a table; is it the eye consciousness or the mental consciousness.

GESHE WANGMO: That's a good question, the one that recognizes, "Oh, this is a table" - that's a mental consciousness; but it is said that an eye consciousness knows table but it doesn't have the thought, This is a table. The actual registering is a conceptual mind.

STUDENT: The eye consciousness doesn't recognize eye consciousness by a mental image.

GESHE WANGMO: No, no. It just knows table. Why do we differentiate those two? For example, you see a reddish color that is in actuality the color of fire. If you're too far away from the reddish fire, you may have doubt that it is actually the color of fire because you're too far away. Your eye consciousness sees the color red, but it doesn't see the color of fire.

There are two assertions: if it is in actuality the color of fire, your eye consciousness sees the color of fire but doesn't know that.

The other: it doesn't see the color of fire, because if it does, it must know it is the color of eye.

I've researched this a lot and accept the latter assertion: I believe that if your eye consciousness knows the color of fire; it knows that it is the color of fire. But if it's too far away the eye consciousness can know a reddish color that is actually the color of fire.

If I see a person from far away and . . . recognizing is not a good word because that implies "knows" Eris. Then there's a conceptual thought, 'Oh, there's Eris.'" If my eye consciousness didn't recognize him, didn't see him, how could the conceptual consciousness know since it is blind and can only take on from the sense consciousness.

STUDENT: Does the eye consciousness just take on color and shape?

GESHE WANGMO: I asked Geshe Thupten Palsang, Does the eye consciousness actually know? Geshe Thupten Palsang says, the eye consciousness explicitly knows Eris. While I assert that it explicitly knows Eris' shape and color and implicitly knows Eris.

The point is, leaving that aside, the eye consciousness doesn't just perceive his shape and color, it knows that and it knows Eris; otherwise, there wouldn't be an eye consciousness that knows a person or a table. It would only know the shape and color of table or a house.

TODD: Eye consciousness knows color of fire and knows fire. Does it also know that it is hot and burning.

GESHE WANGMO: What makes you think that the eye consciousness knows that?

TODD: I think I read it somewhere.

GESHE WANGMO: When you know fire, you know hot and burning because that is its definition. If an eye consciousness knows fire, it needs to know hot and burning because those are its main characteristics. We think of knowing that is reflective,

“Oh, that is hot and burning” - and that’s not the eye consciousness. The eye consciousness sees fire and the mental consciousness says, Move away.

I don’t think the eye consciousness says, . . . because we sometimes confuse the eye consciousness and the eye ball; it is a consciousness, an awareness, it is not a passive transmitter; therefore, it knows fire, it doesn’t hot and burning because it knows what the word fire refers to. The problem, you know the color of fire, not fire itself, to be hot and burning. Because literally, you don’t see fire, it’s tactile, hot and burning. Literally, you see the color of fire.

VEN. PHUNTSOK: If we take Geshe Thupten Palsang’s view that the eye consciousness can explicitly know a person, how would he explain? I’m speculating: would he say that an eye consciousness in the first place can only perceive shape and color, and then would learn over time induced by mental consciousness, so it can add on?

GESHE WANGMO: If Geshe Thupten Palsang says the eye consciousness directly perceives the person, how come when you first perceive a person you only see shape and color. Let me tell you about Geshe Thupten Palsang being such a master, for the good of the student, not at all times: one day they say one thing; and another day they say something else because some things are very difficult to determine. How do you draw a line around an eye consciousness in distinction from a mental consciousness, since it’s imputed?

Last year we asked about an eye consciousness perceiving a vase, he said eye consciousness only sees shape and color . . . then I called about a person, and said that it did know the person. . . .

Some things that doesn’t work for, the teaching isn’t going to say, it doesn’t exist inherently today, and it does exist inherently tomorrow.

So there are different possibilities and you realize it is not easy to distinguish. Geshe Thupten Palsang cited H.H. Dalai Lama saying, there are certain meditation techniques: it is easy to understand that our happiness comes from the kindness of others; if it were difficult, we’d give it more thought and if we did so, it’d have a greater impact on us emotionally. We’d see others as much more precious. Logically, we understand that our happiness comes though others; but then I don’t like others; my happiness is more important. Although I know the logic that focusing on myself leads to more unhappiness, while focusing on the happiness of others leads to more happiness, . . . no emotion arises that will make me change my attitude and behavior because the recognition comes too easily. We need logic that is more complicated.

One teacher I call says, let’s take this point of view: and we try to identify the arguments pro and con.

The generally accepted view is that the eye consciousness knows things.

RENY: . . . how does the mental consciousness . . . it perceives the function of the table or compares it to something it already knows?

GESHE WANGMO: Very good that's Ven. Phuntsok's question that I didn't answer. When you're very young, you don't even see three dimensions. If that's the case, we learn through language, and the mental consciousness and sense consciousnesses aren't separate; they very strongly influence each other.

When you're in love, colors are more brilliant; when you're grieving, food doesn't taste as good.

With my limited understanding since its not explicitly in text, . . . if we are used to seeing things, we start recognizing them; because the mental consciousness has as an influence on the eye consciousness. If you go through this room as an infant, you see blur of shape and color . . . leaves a potential in the mind for the eye consciousness to differentiate between the blue backpack and the blue shirt. If I hadn't trained, it'd just be blue; I think this is through our training in language and designation.

I've heard the don't really have 50 words for snow. Still, they do have many words describing snow. Because of having those varied descriptions, their eye consciousnesses can actually see those differences. In that way, we're able to distinguish things better because of our mental consciousness. If we have words for emotions, we can recognize and identify our own emotions, those are not sense consciousnesses. if we have words for sensations or pains in the body, if you learn to distinguish them, and learn to understand the functions of different types of pains.

So this is clear, how consciousness arises and cause & effect.

## **DISPOSING [OF THE IDEA THAT OUR OBJECTIONS APPLY] EQUALLY TO US - SECTION OF TEXT COMPLETED**

Now, we're going back to the original argument: some say there's no difference between the table I look at and the one I don't look at it.

If I must say that Ishvara is both the cause and non-cause of all phenomena or rice; and you can't differentiate between the Ishvara who is the cause of rice and who is not the cause of rice; then it is the same as asserting the table is both the cause and not the cause of eye consciousness, it's both; even at times when there's no eye consciousness arising, it's kind of both. There's no difference

Dharmakirti on page 145 says, that is not the case. So So returning to the text, I didn't read all of the explanatory material in the last class. You can read it on your own.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In Class 8 Draft-Notes, the explanatory text from page 144 ends after the second to For instance, the eye consciousness perceiving the table is preceded by an awareness that serves as the cause of the eye consciousness since it is responsible for the eye consciousness manifesting as a luminous and knowing mind. The eye consciousness perceiving the table is luminous because the table appears to it, and it is a knowing mind because it is able to perceive the table. If the eye consciousness were not preceded by a former moment of awareness, it would not be able to manifest as an experiencing and aware entity able to cognize its object. The immediately preceding condition, which

[Dharmakirti says in the **Pramanavarttika**:]

*[That] is not [the case], because there is a difference [with regard to being clear or not].*

[Response:] It follows that **it is not** the case that there is no difference between the sense power, etc., [that have have come together and the sense power, etc., that have not have come together], **because there is a difference** with regard to the sense consciousness being clear and not clear, and so forth.

Our own system disagrees that the observed object and the sense power are the causes of the eye consciousness irrespective of whether they have met or not. This is because, if the observed object and the eye sense power have met, an eye consciousness perceiving a table can arise, whereas if they have not met, such an awareness is impossible.

Furthermore, in the case of the eye consciousness perceiving a table, if the empowering condition (the eye sense power) is close enough to the observed object condition (the table), the two conditions generate an eye consciousness that perceives the table clearly. Yet if they are not close, they produce an eye consciousness that does not have a clear perception of the table. Hence, the quality of the two conditions coming together affects the quality of the sense consciousness' perception.

serves as a cause of a sense consciousness, can be any immediately preceding consciousness (mental or sensory) in the mental continuum of the person in which the sense consciousness arises.

In short, a sense consciousness can only arise if it is preceded and directly generated by these three: a sense object, a sense power, and a consciousness.

Returning to the opponent's assertion, the opponent says that there is no difference between the observed object condition and empowering condition that have met and the observed object condition and empowering condition that have not met. Irrespective of whether those two have met or not they produce the resultant sense consciousness.

Taking the example of a table and an eye sense power, the opponent argues that there is no difference between the table that appears to the eye sense power and the table that does not appear to the eye sense power. In both cases, it is the same table. Likewise, there is no difference between the eye sense power to which the table appears and the eye sense power to which the table does not appear. Therefore, since both the table appearing to the eye sense and the eye sense power to which the table appears are the causes of the eye consciousness perceiving the table, there is no reason (according to the opponent) why the other two should not be the causes of that eye consciousness.

By analogy – the opponent argues – Ishvara is the cause of all results although there is no difference between Ishvara the cause of all results and Ishvara the non-cause of all results.

In Tibetan, *clear* has many meanings: more obvious, positive, stronger. Someone asked a question regarding that. Is there a difference, the closer you get, the more you perceive of an object.

There are so many different degrees of perceiving a table; and there's a whole discussion about being merely labelled. How much do I have to see in order to say I've seen a table. How much do you have to see to recognize. I'm putting up a hand, and if you just see the arm and hand, you don't necessarily know it's my hand.

Once someone was Wechatting without identifying himself. He sent me a photo just of his eyes; and I recognized him.

We both say, 'We see Tashi', but Gilah is much closer so she sees more of Tashi. So this is another example of our thinking we all see the same thing, when we see "I see that table", but it means so much. There's also clear and less clear seeing.

AIDAN: Closer only up to a point.

GESHE WANGMO: I totally agree. The color of fire, I don't want to be too close. There must be a certain distance.

VEN. PHUNTSOK: there's a strong theoretical implication. There's got to be a certain distance and proximity for maximum comprehensibility unfolds. Before we had this proximity discussion, it's actually a proximity / distance that is very relative.

GESHE WANGMO: Yes. If it is too far or too close you can't perceive; so seeing depends on other factors, proximity.

We say the table is the cause of the eye consciousness because it has the quality of facing the eye, being in the sphere of vision of the eye, in an appropriate proximity to the eye that enables seeing. Due to the circumstances, because the table doesn't exist independently but in dependence on other objects. So even cause and effect are labelled and designated, and can be a correct label.

[Dharmakirti says in the ***Pramanavarttika***:]

*Since they do not have the capacity individually [to generate a sense consciousness] [And] there is no difference between the nature [of the conditions coming together or not], It follows that even [when the three conditions] have come together, there is no capacity. Therefore, the difference is established.*

If you claim there's no difference between the three conditions, particularly, the object and eye sense power, whether they come together or not they're both the causes. So he turns it around, if you hold there's no difference as to whether the table meets the eye sense power . . . its not really an effective reason on its own, but it shows absurdities of position in conjunction with other reasons.

If that were not so, it would follow that **even** when the three conditions **have come together**, they would **not have the capacity** to generate a sense consciousness, because when they have not come together, the three conditions **individually do not have that capacity**, and **because there is no difference between the nature** of the three conditions

that have come together [and the nature of the three conditions that have not come together].

Our own system continues the debate by stating that if it were not the case that the observed object condition and the empowering condition that have met differ from those that have not met, the following absurdity would occur:

It would follow that even when the three conditions have come together they would not generate a sense consciousness, because each of the three conditions on its own is not able to produce that awareness, and because – according to the opponent – there is no difference between the three conditions that have come together and those that have not come together.

**Therefore, a difference** between the three conditions that have come together and the three conditions that have not come together **is established**, because one witnesses the difference between a sense consciousness that has been generated and [one] that has not been generated in dependence on the three conditions having come together or not having come together.<sup>4</sup>

We can witness it through our own experience, directly perceive

[Dharmakirti says in the **Pramanavarttika**:]

*Therefore, some do not have the capacity individually.  
When they come together the qualities will become possible;  
They are the causes. Ishvara, and so forth are not.  
Because there is no difference [between Ishvara, etc., and those  
which do not generate results].*

Regarding the subject, **Ishvara, and so forth**, they **are not** the causes of all results, **because** they and that which does not generate results are not of a **different** nature. It follows that there is a pervasion, because with regard to **some** [phenomena] that **individually do not have the capacity** to generate a common result, **when they have come together** [with the other causes], **the qualities** of the result **will become possible** and **they are the causes** of the common result.

This only makes sense because we talked about it earlier; he's connecting back to the earlier argument.

Our own system concludes this outline by presenting a syllogism that would be logically correct if Ishvara and so forth were both a cause and permanent: *regarding the subject, Ishvara, and so forth, they are not the causes of all results, because they are of one nature with that which does not generate results.* The words “and so forth” include the creator God

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<sup>4</sup> Thus, on the basis of the different reasonings presented above, it is established that there is a difference between the three conditions that have come together and the three conditions that have not come together. The main difference is that in the first case a sense consciousness can come into existence, whereas in the second case it cannot.

asserted by other spiritual systems, such as Judaism, Christianity, and so forth.

If Ishvara is both permanent and a cause of rice; he must be the non-cause of rice when rice isn't growing, . . . he must be both . . .

The syllogism has a pervasion, *i.e.*, whatever is of one nature with that which does not generate results is necessarily not the cause of all results. This is because a phenomenon such as a seed in a storehouse, that has not come together with the other causes such as water, warmth, etc., required to produce a common result, a sprout, is not the cause of the sprout, since it is of one nature with *that which does not generate the sprout*. It is of one nature with that which does not generate the sprout, because not generating a sprout is a quality of that seed.

Not generating a sprout is a quality of that . . .

And those are two contradictory qualities.

Yet when it does come together with water, warmth and so forth, the seed is the cause of a sprout, for at that time it is of one nature with *that which generates the sprout*. The latter seed is of one nature with that which generates the sprout, because being able to produce a sprout is a quality of that seed – making possible the growth of the sprout and thus the qualities of the sprout.

We don't have time for questions for study now. The next part goes into whether or not omniscience possible. The opponent argues that if you say there's no creator; we assert omniscience is impossible.

Next time I'll ask you the answers to the questions for this section<sup>5</sup> on page 147, so please prepare answers and the reading of two more pages.

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<sup>5</sup> 1. Why does the first opponent in this outline say that owing to our own system's previous objections, it follows that soil, etc. are not the causes of sprouts?

2. What is our own system's response to the first opponent?

3. What is the observed object condition?

4. What is the empowering condition?

5. What is the immediately preceding condition?

6. Why does the second opponent assert that the observed object that has not met with the eye sense power is the cause of an eye consciousness?

7. According to our own system, why is the observed object that has not met with an eye sense power unable to generate an eye consciousness?