

**Chapter Two of Dharmakirti's *Pramanavarttika*
Advanced Buddhist Philosophy Course – Term 5
Class 4 - 2016 September 26 – Monday¹ -**

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Institute for Buddhist Dialectics, McLeod Ganj, India

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D R A F T of CLASS 4 Transcript-NOTES

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REVIEW

Impermanence inseparability with Cause & Effect

Impermanence in term of cause and effect - those cannot be separated. Think of any . . . made of atoms that are constantly changing and moving. The table that seems so solid is actually changing moment to moment. That's easy.

In terms of consciousness, the object that consciousness perceives always changes, so the mind perceiving the object changes; even though the changes may be so subtler, we're not aware of it, the environment is always changes so the consciousness is always changing. So when you start meditating, there's constant chatter. Though there are great similarities in our thought - change doesn't mean changing into something totally different. We continue to call this table a table even though its parts are changing moment to moment and doesn't meant that the table is the same moment-to-moment. Similarly with Ven. Yangchen.

But we have a very strong sense of permanence. Do you have the sense that there's the same 'I' still there since you entered this room. Most people say, "Yes, I'm the same 'I'".

We have discussed a lot of this. We tried to make it relevant in the sense: how does not understanding that cause us trouble. Something that causes us a lot of pain is holding a grudge: and we're very good at that. The person who harmed me a week ago, I'm still angry at them; even though the person has changed.

Love and compassion are different. Attachment we feel the same person who gave me happiness in the past gives it to me now. But love and compassion can be different. You can't be angry with a person since they're . . . love and compassion . . . anger, jealousy, arrogance are not rooted in reality or they don't work; they require misperception.

What does Buddhist practice mean in terms of dealing with the afflictions: it doesn't mean studying meditating . . . those are only tools that aid Buddhist practice. What is Buddhist practice?

Ven. Yangchen: changing the mind.

GW: The Tibetan word is *chos*, which means transform. . . . to diminish our anger, attachment, etc., and replace those states with healthier states. Yoga is about physical health. Replacing the body with freedom from diseases.



So H.H. Dalai Lama calls Dharma practice, mental hygiene. Buddha doesn't care if the number of his followers increases or decreases. You can be a follower of the organic health movement or not, but the important thing is that you eat healthy food. But even more important is mental health; if you feel physically unwell is is not too bad if you have a happy mind. . . . it is all about reducing the afflictions.

Our afflictions are like parasites that eat sugar. Now days if you have giardia, don't eat sugar. They feed on sugar and come back.

Our misperceptions of reality feed our afflictions; our misperceptions of what is going on around us -- if we see things are they really are, you can't develop afflictions even if you want to. If you don't have the causes for something to arise, it can't arise.

If you want to be a well afflicted person -- afflictions are those states of minds that are called destructive emotions, etc., and we all have them unless there's someone here who doesn't have anger . . . you may actually not have them or maybe you are in denial.

What is difficult to understand is: how phenomena really exist. That's why we spend a lot of time studding. If you think, why are we studying this? It's like a puzzle and we need to put the pieces together to get a sense of how phenomena really exist. It is like any profound view, it is made up of other things. There's no chunk of knowledge I can give you that will . . .

Our psyches are so complicated and layered, and it makes it even harder that we're not even aware of many of our emotions. . . . nonetheless, those emotions govern my actions and generate my future feelings: feelings of insecurity, unhappiness . . .

Since our minds are so complicated; and Its so difficult to identify our misperceptions, we need to take it slowly.

You can't understand the universe in a few hours. It is so big and complicated. Our thoughts are like the multitude of galaxies and stars -- if you stop focusing on a thought, it's gone.

We're not used to having our awareness take to mind our awareness. We're used to taking to mind cappuccino, external objects, but we're not used to taking to mind our own awarenesses and thoughts. Our brains are so complicated and the coarse thoughts are based on the mind. Our waking minds and dreaming minds need the brain. Scientists have found the brain is so complicated, and that's necessary to support our very complicated minds.

So what did we talk about last time: we have a very popular misconception: something can be the cause of something else, the cause of us, but that cause is not changing. We have a sense that the cause of who we are now is a static object. But that's impossible.

We talked about two kinds of causes: *substantial causes* and *cooperative conditions*. Our own mind must have had something that transformed into the present mind. Something must have preceded it that transformed into the present mind; and that required a former mind that gave rise to it; so you must have a continuum of former moments that gave rise to the next moment.

A former moment of table gave rise to this table. At the time of its production, different substantial continua came together to form the continua of this table. You couldn't ever have a table without a former moment of the substances that made this table.

Classic example, a sprout that eventual grows into an apple tree. You have a seed that grows into a sprout that grows into a tree.

The seed can be tiny because the seed alone doesn't produce the tree. The cooperative conditions - warmth of the sun, the labor of the farmer's arms, etc. That is true for any phenomenon; you always have those.

Which means: if there were a creator god who creates everything: is that god the substantial cause of everything or the cooperative condition? The philosophical systems here that

Sometimes people ask: does Buddhism deny the existence of god? No, there are celestial beings in different realms. There's so much we can't perceive. If 500 years ago you told people there are subtle beings we can't perceive with our senses, they wouldn't believe it. Perhaps in the future, scientists may find a way to measure the wave energies of beings in continent realms.

Since Buddhism doesn't assert an objective reality out there, it doesn't matter. Since there are subjective realities, there can be other realms including celestial realms. But did that god make everything? No.

Some of the non-Buddhists assert a god that is very similar to Abrahamic faiths, or Western Asian: the creator of everything.

If god is the creator of everything: the first question, is the seed no longer the cause of anything now? If you didn't have a God, could a seed not be able to give rise to a sprout?

....

From a Buddhist point of view, you don't need god. It could be that a celestial being helps in the process, just as a farmer does, but that a god is necessary for the entire process, no. If god is perfect and god created the world, then the world should be perfect.

Here some arguments that are mentioned that are not as straight-forward ones, we can understand ourselves.

As we said, the Rice Seedling Sutra mentions three conditions:

1) Immovability: it is not true that a result arises as the result of God having the thought, This should come into existence.

Some non-Buddhists systems assert that the consciousness of god 'moves' - it is a non-physical object; and that movement gives rise to the seed or sprout. God has a thought that is the creational thought and that gives rise to the object. But that is impossible, to Buddhists: is it a cooperative condition - that transforms the original object so it is no longer the same.

Yesterday's consciousness is no longer present in order to give rise to the present condition. Then if god transformed into the sprout; god would no longer be present - that is the same exact god would not.

But they assert that god is permanent.

If you have a substantial cause, the seed has to change in order to become a tree in the end; everything about the see has totally transformed.

The water and fertilizer, all those have changed.

If there's a substantial cause or cooperative condition - God can't be both permanent and a cause because causes participate in the production and change in that participation.

The reasoning that is presented here, if God is the cause of everything: is he the cause of everything at all times.

If something is not produced, then a certain phenomenon cannot be its cause. There are times when the rice grows and times when rice doesn't grow and at that time, its cause is not active. A seed without the requisite cooperative conditions cannot be the cause of a sprout. There's not a single phenomenon that arises from just one cause. We have great misconceptions with regard that - we blame our problems on our parents.

It is impossible to have one cause that gives rise to a result; always many cooperative conditions; so you can't have just a seed. You need warmth, moisture, fertilizers.

With regard to Ishvara: if god were the cause of everything: with regarding to a particular object, when that object

Let's say, Ishvara is the cause of rice. Before the harvest, you pray to god for a good harvest.

Last year, Aidan said not everyone says God is responsible for individual activities . . . but there's still a strong sense that if I worship and make supplicating prayers to god, I can get a strong harvest and, even, blight my neighbors harvest. Which prayer is god going to listen to there are so many contradictory prayers.

With regard to God, there's god who is the cause of rice; but in that case, let's take a particular rice paddy, if god is the cause of rice on that paddy then it should always be growing. But there are times when no rice is growing on the rice in the paddy.

So therefore, God must also be the cause of non-rice on that paddy. Just for the sake of the argument. Dharmakirti is arguing with Buddhists. This isn't for intention of arguing with non-Buddhists. At the time of Dharmakirti, he was very respectful to non-Buddhists, but this is directed at Buddhists who had innate tendencies to believe in god.

The view of god stands in contradiction to essential Buddhist concept: Karma, Selflessness, Bodhicitta.

If Buddha, himself, is perceived as some kind of creator god - and many Buddhists do have that view and petition in prayer that Buddha grant them this, that or the other.

. . . if as we ask a doctor to help us, give us a prescriptions and by following it, we are able to get better. . .

So the argument is directed at Buddhists who hold those views. Especially as western Buddhists, we have very strong habits, familiarities with a creator god. So from a Buddhist perspective, we have to work hard to transform our minds.

There are times when Ishvara produces the rice; and sometimes he doesn't so does that mean there are times when Ishvara is the cause of rise and times when Ishvara is the non-cause of rice.

When we debate, we put ourselves into the shoes of all the views, including those against Buddhism. Buddha said don't accept anything I tell you; whatever I tell you,

analyze it to the best of your ability. So you can assume that maybe Buddha is wrong and the non-Buddhists are right.

So you as the defender are sitting down, and the person standing up is the challenger. You have both opportunities.

So the challenger says: you are a follower of Ishvara. So you just now defend the view of a creator god.

VY:

This is a particular case here. We're talking about a specific non-Buddhists system where god is the cause of everything; god is the cause of rice.

Would you agree that if Ishvara the cause of rice then he is also the non-cause of rice when it doesn't grow.

You may think, I never think that; but you may on some days. It is helpful to go through the reasoning because you may . . . if you feel that something is permanent and the cause of the phenomenon, then the idea that this phenomenon is also the cause of the rice in the paddy and also the non-cause. Just focusing on one particular phenomenon: at some times it is the cause and others the non-cause.

If Ishvara is the . . . then he must be . . . because if he did shift, he would be impermanent. Shift in the sense of changing into something else. So he needs to be both the cause and the non-cause of rice.

Q&A

AIDAN: The cause of other things as well as rice.

GESHE WANGMO: Yes, but here we're talking just about rice.

AIDAN: So can he be the cause of more than one thing at same time?

GESHE WANGMO: Yes. Whatever we say is always in relation to something else. I'm the cause of something because there's some effect that I'm the cause of. Buddhism takes relative to a whole other level . . .

. . . 5:40

Does that make sense? This is just one line of reasoning: something does not shift.

If you have a sense of permanence -- as I said, we have a sense of permanence all of the time; we're just not aware of it. Afflictions feed on our misperceptions; without those, we'd have no afflictions. Holding a grudge is an affliction and you are perceiving the target of the grudge as the same person. Let's say, they destroyed your reputation; burned your laptop, etc.

We may say, they are the cause of all my (biggest) problems.

Nike last week destroyed my life, so I'm angry at Niko; since Niko is the same person as last week. What can my aversion of the grudge hold on: it holds onto Niko from last week. If Niko from last week are the same I am thinking they are the same -- if he's changing, they are not the same. But I perceive this week's Niko as the same as last

week's Niko; Niko of the last seven days and today's Niko is the same; and he caused all my trouble. But six days ago, he didn't cause me any trouble, because he slept in all day so he didn't have any opportunity to trouble me. Really caused me a lot of trouble.

So this is how holding a grudge worked. But six days ago, he didn't cause he took a rest - so he was the non-cause of my problems. If all the Nikos of the last seven days are the same, he couldn't shift from being the cause and non-cause because he is permanent.

Our mind is truly amazing and can do the most bizarre things. At one moment, I perceive him as permanent and the cause of all my problems; whereas, if my anger goes away, I see him as impermanent. When I see him as impermanent, my grudge goes away. I'm not thinking about it consciously.

So, if I consciously want to work with my aversion and anger, this is where this is beneficial.

This text touches many different ideas, sometimes on the basis of god or other concepts. Holding these bizarre and contradictory views that are bound to cause us troubles.

Whatever we do, it needs to be relevant in our every day life. This study. If he is the cause and the non-cause of my trouble, he cannot be permanent.

STUDENT: What if we say, Ishvara is the cause of rice and the cause of no-rice.

GESHE WANGMO: There's a problem with that: no-rice. What is no-rice?

The absence of Barak Obama on the table is permanent.

There are two responses: no-rice is not a impermanent phenomenon, it is just . . .

Or one can say he is the cause of rice and the cause of the empty paddy field. He is the cause of rice with respect just to rice, and the cause of no rice. We say something is a cause in relation to something.

He can be the cause of rice. In one moment, Ishvara is the cause of non-rice and simultaneously the cause of apples.

If he cannot change, which is the original assertion, that Ishvara is permanent, then he is both

KOREAN NUN: The Buddhist point of view of Ishvara.

GESHE WANGMO: her question is: you are trying to establish that the creator of everything is not permanent, then your question is Ishvara is both permanent and impermanent.

STUDENT: My question is about the Buddhist point of view of the god . . .

GESHE WANGMO: Okay. If Ishvara were existent - her question is: are we establishing that Ishvara is permanent and impermanent, both.

We're trying to exist either that Ishvara doesn't exist at all - though that Buddhist will accept there is a being, Ishvara, but not the one creator of all.

Buddhism talks of creators: our mind is the creator of our reality; but not god. Something external to us is not the creator. This is a wrong view. So if we hold that view, we can't just tell ourselves, it's no true; and move on.

From a Buddhist point of view, it is a wrong view, you may disagree, but there's no living being that created everything about that.

So we need to see the absurdities of the point of view that Ishvara is a permanent creator.

So we talk about, if Ishvara hypothetically existed. We formulate, if what we perceive were hypothetically true, what would it mean? What would be the consequences?

If I were to say, $1+1$ is 3; I could say, $1+1$ is 2. And you might walk away still convinced of the wrong view. I might say, if you bake a cake on Monday and a cake on Tuesday, then I must have three cakes. I take your assertion and see what would be reality. You do this often enough in response,

Likewise, with Niko, he destroyed my life 7 days ago; Niko did that; and he's the same guy, I should be angry with him. Hypothetically, he may save my life on the sixth day, I would have to be still angry at him.

Buddhism is all about that. What is the self? The reasoning? Is there really this I that is the center of the universe; I am more important than you are. I do everything to work for this I. Where is it? You're sure it is there, and then we look for it.

KOREAN NUN:

GESHE WANGMO: Let me just finish, and then I'll answer.

The point is to show that such a creator does not exist; we aren't trying to prove that Ishvara is both permanent and impermanent . . .

KOREAN NUN: When I read this, I can't find an answer.

GESHE WANGMO: So you asked, when two people debate, do you actually find an answer? This is important. You may think that we debate a topic like this for a few hours and go home and think, Okay, now I get it. It's not that easy. If I go to the gym one time, I won't have the body of an Olympian.

Either something is impermanent or permanent, it cannot be. But other debates are not so clear.

STUDENT: Is it the same with someone who has mental illness and erratic behavior; they are changing, but still they have their erratic behavior. So they're labelled as a depression guy, . . .

GESHE WANGMO: You're talking about mentally challenged people? From the Buddhist perspective, we're all mentally challenged; it is just relative.

It relates back to your question about insanity. Our mind is neither sane (which we could define as "seeing things as they really are" - because everything is relative, *e.g.*, long can only be determined in relation to something). I think we would agree, that insane people perceive things that are not present. So sanity means to perceive things as they really exist.

From the Buddhist perspective, Buddha perceives things as they really are. Everyone else who is not a Buddha has some degree of misperception. So if the original definition of insanity holds, we're all insane; but there's a scale of mental misperception.

I'm sure you know the story of a king, there was some kind of prophecy that there's going to be a rain that will make everyone insane. The king heard of this, and stayed indoors; while everyone else became insane; and the King felt so lonely, he went out into the rain

Every society has its own crazy tics -- Buddha said if you want to continue suffer, I have a solution for removing misperception, see reality and suffering will end.

This is what this is trying to help us to do.

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NEW MATERIAL FROM TEXT

Refuting that Ishvara can be both the Cause & Non-Cause of Rice in a Paddy

I want to continue now. Just to help you get into the first part, since the text is pretty intense. Let me continue the text.

If Ishvara were a permanent cause, it would be both the *cause* and the *non-cause* of a particular object. We've gone through that reasoning. The example given here is the *rice paddy*. Next is the way that Buddhist scriptures present these reasonings:

Therefore, our own system argues: regarding the subject, Ishvara, at the very time he is the cause of rice he would also have to be the non-cause of rice, because he is considered to be permanent and thus does not change from being the cause of rice to the non-cause of rice, or from being the non-cause of rice to the cause of rice.

Those asserting [a permanent] Ishvara cannot argue that Ishvara is the cause of rice when the rice is growing and the non-cause of rice when the rice paddy lies dormant (without simultaneously being both the cause and non-cause of rice), for otherwise they would contradict their original assertion. They would contradict their assertion because it would follow that Ishvara changes from being the cause of rice to not being the cause of rice, and thus not be permanent.

Hence, our own system contends: if Ishvara were a permanent cause, it would follow that he is both the cause *and* the non-cause of rice.

So in the debate, I would have to accept that Niko is both the cause of my problems and the non-cause of my problems

I asserted he was the cause of my problems, . . . strong sense of permanence - same mountain, same river. This is not rationale. It is not like someone challenging: Do you really think it is the same. What is it that makes us, mostly feelings; not my rational thoughts. It doesn't make sense to beat up Niko, he's a lot bigger than me.

RIGZIN: Ishvara is the cause of rice and the . . . and get around this problem.

GESHE WANGMO: okay, but he is still the cause of non-rice. We looked, with regard of only rice, if he is the cause of rice, does that mean he is always the cause of rice; but for the empty paddy, he is the non-cause of rice.

Holding up the text in comparison to a pen, it is long; in relation to a particular object,

Here with the cause and non-result, it is as though I am saying in relation to this it is long and short. The pen being the rice; and the text being the cause. If this object - text - were the cause of the pen being long or short, it would have to change.

I think he is the same guy; that's the only reason I can hold a grudge, . . .

STUDENT: The past is permanent, so you are angry with something that is permanent.

GESHE WANGMO: Right now, the past is gone, the past is no longer present. Today's Benji is there right now, only because yesterday's Benji is gone; because yesterday's Benji's is the cause of present Benjithe past is long gone

STUDENT: You always have to . . . if you have children, why do you love them?

. . .

STUDENT: So there's a future, and the Benji here today is affected by Benji yesterday, and

GESHE WANGMO: We're not saying . . . someone who spent a lot of money on finding out she'd been an Egyptian princess in the past, . . .

Karma is the same: if I receive harm, it's because I harmed someone in the past, so I better make sure not to do the same thing again. . . . it's like seeds in the earth that lie fallow for a long time.

I can choose to beat him back and expect future karmic retribution or be patient in order to avoid future . . .

STUDENT: . . . mind consciousness, is there an idea of relativity and impermanence?

GESHE WANGMO: Her question, for a Buddha, is there relativity or impermanence; do those things still exist? I have an answer, but I'm not sure it makes sense. Directly by the way of the Buddha, no. But for us, yes.

In a straight forward manner, Buddha perceives the lack of inherent existence of everything ... even though our thoughts create reality, but in sequence or order. Saying we create reality of conventional truth, doesn't mean that

water flows uphill. What a Buddha perceives directly is just the lack of these phenomena having any kind of independent existence; but through what we perceive, he perceives conventional reality.

One real meditator gave this teaching: whatever appears to us right now, that conventional reality appears due to our misperception; the imprints when those imprints are gone, in a Buddha's continuum . . . it doesn't exist that way at all. Like an optical illusion, things that seem so solid and real don't exist that way; only when you're a Buddha . . . conventional truth is merely labelled, merely designated.

When you say a person, a human being, a man walking down the street. We all have different thoughts about this man — what is there in this man without the thoughts. The man is a brother in relation to a sibling; so there's a thought thinking brother. He's a father in relation to his children; a son in relation to his parents. We don't find anything from the side of the object we can say about that without relating to something other than the object.

There's **nothing coming from the side of the object**; nothing there from the side of the object, only in relation to that and that; and there are thoughts that designated, Tibetan. There's no Tibetan-ness there without relating to something else, his hair, nose, passport.

We have created, labelled this world, and now believe it is really there.

A forest, you have lots of trees, it seems to be a forest. That's just a name we give to a lot of trees. Even the tree is just labelled on the basis of branches and trunk . . . that's our most profound mistake.

So in answer, . . . you can only explain in relation to something other than itself. Is time existent objectively; no, only in result to something else.

Through us there is this world we created.

Going back to Dharmakirti.

[Dharmakirti says in the **Pramanavarttika**:]

*Just as the entity [of Ishvara] is a cause
At that time he is a non-cause,
[It is not feasible that] at the very [time] he is, owing to whatever [reason],
accepted
To be a cause, [he] not [be] accepted to be a non-cause.*

. . . to be in the nature of is an attribute of something.

If Ishvara or Niko were really permanent, this would be one of the absurdities that result.

Dharmakirti goes on:

[Dharmakirti says in the ***Pramanavarttika***:]

*If in relation to a weapon and medicine, etc.
Nagpa's wound [is created] and healed,
Why not conceive of an unrelated log
As the very cause [of the creation and healing of the wound]?*

If [someone were to say that] there is no pervasion, then **why**, it would follow, is it **not** reasonable to **conceive of an unrelated log** to be **the cause** that cures and generates a wound? It would be reasonable because the former [reason] does not have a pervasion.

It follows it is unreasonable to accept [that an unrelated log is the cause that cures and generates a wound] because it is feasible that the generating and the healing and curing of **Nagpa's wound** [take place] **in relation to a weapon and medicine, etc.** [respectively]; it is not feasible otherwise.

GESHE WANGMO: In response to the above debate, an opponent may argue that there is no pervasion. So *pervasion* . . . when being a man is pervaded by being human, in the sense that if you think of human being like an ocean or a cover, it covers men and women.

So, if say, regarding Niko, he is a human being because he is a man; but it is not the other way around. I cannot say, Niko is a man because he's a human being. Why not? Because being a human also pervades women.

So the pervasion is the idea of a larger category pervades its sub-categories; but the sub-categories don't pervade the larger category.

. . . although someone is a man, it doesn't mean that he is a human. In debate, you'd say, there's no pervasion.

Here someone disagrees, There's no pervasion because I don't agree that because A is C it follows that it is B.

In response to the above debate, an opponent may argue that there is no pervasion. In other words, he may contend that even though Ishvara does not change from being the cause of a phenomenon to being its non-cause, nor from being the non-cause of a phenomenon to being its cause, that does not mean that when Ishvara is the cause of a phenomenon he is also the non-cause of that phenomenon. Ishvara is not also the non-cause of the phenomenon because he is its cause. Therefore, the opponent may respond by saying that although there is no difference between Ishvara the cause and Ishvara the non-cause of a phenomenon³, he is nonetheless the cause of that phenomenon.

³ The opponent asserts that there are times when Ishvara is the cause of the phenomenon and times when he is not the cause of the phenomenon. But since Ishvara is permanent he does not change from being a cause of the phenomenon to being its non-cause, and vice versa. Therefore, from the perspective of the opponent, there is no difference between Ishvara the cause and Ishvara the non-cause of a phenomenon.

GESHE WANGMO: Why do they say it is not both a cause and a non-cause? Because if Ishvara is a non-cause, it doesn't make sense that he produces things; so you would end up giving an absurd response.

If an opponent were to respond in that way, the following question would arise: if a non-cause of a phenomenon can be the cause of that phenomenon, can a totally unrelated object be the cause of a phenomenon?

GESHE WANGMO: That is, if a non-cause can be a cause of a phenomenon, then anything totally unrelated can be the cause of a phenomenon. Due to the opponent having odd view

Here, Dharmakirti gives the example of a person called "Nagpa" who was injured and has a wound. The wound was inflicted by a weapon and treated with medicine. That which produced the wound was a weapon, while that which caused the wound to heal was medicine. So the weapon and the medicine are connected to that wound as they were the cause of the wound and the cause of its healing, respectively.

But it would be absurd to assert that a totally unrelated object such as a wooden beam caused or healed Nagpa's wound.

However, our own system argues that if the opponent were to say that there is no pervasion (*i.e.*, that Ishvara is the cause of a phenomenon, although it is impossible to differentiate between Ishvara the cause and Ishvara the non-cause of that phenomenon), it would absurdly follow that it is reasonable to assert that an unrelated log produced or cured Nagpa's wound.

GESHE WANGMO: Essentially, in that case, anything would be possible. So it is helpful to think it is true. We believe if we are stingy we have no money. It's bizarre. It's difficult to see the result of something in this lifetime. You may be a mass murder and not be killed in this lifetime, and die in bed at age 90.

Buddhism talks about many life times, but from the perspective of one lifetime. I've seen people who are very open to giving — a good example is one of my classmates, a monk who had very little, but he was the opposite of stingy. He was never stingy. He'd always try to pay for a dinner. Usually when Tibetans go to a restaurant, one person pays. . . . one of his students in China is one of the richest people there; and he doesn't know what to do with all of his money.

So I know some people who are very stingy and nothing is coming to him. It is just an attitude, wanting to give, time, help. It is shown you an really watch it. People who are really tight - do they have a money problem that because they are so stingy, that even having millions, they feel poor. Whereas, those who are content . . . if you have money problems, be generous. Always set something aside. Some religious systems say give 10%, make the

experiment. Give time. . . we have this instinctive way -- don't count your money; if you know it's exactly there, you don't want to give.

We have the sense, if I'm selfish I'll be happier. If I don't look after myself, who will?

I don't know a guy named Nagpa, but this is just a 6th century example.

There's a difference between sensible and being stingy.

If it is possible that he is the cause of my troubles and the non-cause of my troubles, then this table could be the cause of my troubles.

Look at your life, how many times do we hold contradictory views and act out of those.

I put the brackets in the original text so the pithy verse can be more understandable:

[Dharmakirti says in the ***Pramanavarttika***:

[Since Ishvara and not generating results are] not of a different nature

It is also not correct that [Ishvara] creates [all results].

GESHE WANGMO: New idea. On the 7th day Niko is the cause of my problems, on the 6th the non-cause, so he is the non-cause and cause of all my problems; so all things are problems.

Being "In the Nature of" Something; "Being of one nature, but different [isolates]

Now the argument is: Niko is in the nature of not being the cause of my problems. What does it mean to be "in the nature of" something.

Being of one nature: being different but still of one nature; different isolates but of one nature. In Buddhism, this is very important. Everything is interdependent, so when you hold a wrong view, all sorts of absurdities.

If Niko is permanent, then all of you are permanent; you're connected by similarities.

Everything is interdependent but everything is not inter-connected in the same way; there's a difference.

When I say, "Microphone," "microphone" are those the same or different? When I take those two to mind, they appear in the same way, so they are the same.

When I say, Table or Choksay - are they the same or different?

They refer to the same object but they appear slightly differently because the word I use is different. The way my conceptual mind takes to mind, chok-say.

Even in one language, in Tibetan, the *Moon* is also called a *Rabbit-Possessor*; that's just another word for moon. So even though *Rabbit-Possessor* and *moon* refer to the same object, they appear different conceptually. To my sense consciousness the moon looks the same. So conceptually, they are different but they are of the same nature, because when you point to something, it is the same thing. If you destroy the moon, you destroy the *rabbit possessor*.

So different doesn't mean totally different; just different in appearance to conceptual mind; and this is referred to as being different isolates, different isolates referring to the same object.

So the man on the street who is a father, a brother and a son. This concept is very important for understanding the ultimate view of phenomena. Why?

Lower systems: from sense consciousness, they all appear the same: the man, brother, son, etc. The difference is only conceptual. Your eye consciousness doesn't think father, brother, etc.

From the point of view of the sense consciousness, they refer to one object; but to the conceptual mind, they are different isolates. So to the direct mind, they are of one nature; to the conceptual mind, they're of different nature.

From the perspective of Emptiness, all phenomena are of one nature; from the point of view of conceptually, they're merely imputed by conceptuality.

The lack of inherent existence is the same nature of you and me. But from the perspective of designation, there's a different.

The lower philosophical schools explain, when we talk about a phenomenon, although the same object is there -- though *Prasangika-Madhyamika* (Middle Way Consequentialists) disagree -- but as an introductory view -- they say: Okay. Assume we all perceive the same external object with our eye consciousness. We just perceive something there that is beyond word to the senses; and conceptually, we make up a whole new . . . that they are different when I say, father, son, table, chok-say -- . . . table and chok-say are of one nature and different isolates.

Likewise, father, brother refer to the same person, they're of one nature, but different isolates. The object I refer to is the same; take your attributes:

Trinley as a person, there's so much about Trinley that is other than Trinley. You have his mind, that's not Trinley, his body is not Trinley; Trinley who is a good cook; Trinley who is impermanent - different attributes that are all of one nature with Trinley. You can't have Trinley without all of these attributes.

If you were to shave his head - right now his hair is part of him so it is of one entity, but after he shaves it, it is a different Trinley. If last year, he was very

angry; but he's removed it and become very loving, therefore the original anger that was one with the original Trinley, the original Trinley is gone, because they were of one nature.

Trinley and I are not of one nature; you shoot me, and he won't die.

Trinley can still connect to me and influence me. A part of him can become a cause of something in me -- a moment later, I can affect him. We affect one another as cause and effect, but we're not *of one nature*.

There is a way that phenomena are connected in different ways. It's important to understand that parts of me are of one nature, . . . I impute Trinley on the basis of his parts. Who is Trinley?

Who am I? From your perspective, I am other; from mine, you are other. Who is this actual person? There are parts of a person on the basis of which, I call this person Benjie. It feels as though there's a separate Kelsang Wangmo sitting inside of me.

The main problem is that I feel there's a separate Kelsang Wangmo; and this Kelsang Wangmo is much more important than Benjie; and I act accordingly.

To those of you who've studied Buddhism, some of this sounds familiar. On this merely imputed 'I', if that 'I' really existed, there are only two possibilities: if Trinley really existed inherently, Trinley would have to be either inherently one with his mind; totally identical with them; or totally separate. It is very difficult to understand that.

If there were really intrinsic tableness here, it would either be identical with the legs, surface, etc., so I could never say, The surface of the table, that implies an owner, and you don't say, the surface of the surface.

But since phenomena don't exist inherently and are merely designated, it means they can be of one entity with their parts, and still different.

This is one of the most essential eideas. So this text deals with such.

The quality of Ishvara of not generating the result is of one nature with Ishvara; you can't separate it.

Right now, I have endless qualities. I am not the builder of a house; I am not hitting any of the millions of sbs; and those are millions of my qualities. I'm of one nature with sitting here.

Whatever activity we engage in is also of one nature.

This is basically saying that, not much more:

[Dharmakirti says in the ***Pramanavarttika***:]

[*Since Ishvara and not generating results are*] *not of a different nature*
It is also not correct that [Ishvara] creates [all results].

Regarding the subject, [Ishvara], **it is also not correct that** he is the creator of all results, because he is **not of a different nature** than that which does not generate results.

Our own system further argues that Ishvara has not created all results because Ishvara is of the same nature as that which does not generate results.

Regarding the subject, [Ishvara], **it is also not correct that** he is the creator of all results, because he is **not of a different nature** than that which does not generate results.

Our own system further argues that Ishvara has not created all results because Ishvara is of the same nature as that which does not generate results.

In general, the cause of a result is *that which generates (or produces) the result*, while the non-cause of a result is *that which does not generate the result*.

Also, an object that is the cause of a result is *of the same nature as* that which is the cause of the result, and an object that is the non-cause of a result is *of the same nature as* that which is the non-cause of the result, because being the cause of a result or being the non-cause of a result are attributes or characteristics of that object, and whatever is an attribute of an object is necessarily *of the same nature as* that object.

GESHE WANGMO: Thereofre, we are not the same as our body or mind. Some people hate themselves because they don't like their body. Or they hate themselves because they've done some action.

. . . when Niko gives me a dirty look? He's actually frowning at my body, and not me. But since I feel my body and I are connected, I feel he is frowning at me. The self is not the body, but I have a sense that they are connected, and if he hits me, I don't have the sense he hit my body, I feel he hit me. There's a difference. We feel the I and boyd are connected but still different. Sometimes we feel another extreme, "I am my anger", I am my body. But that's an extreme because we're merely desiganted.

Hence, according to our own system, Ishvara is of the same nature as that which does not generate results because he is the non-cause of results. Ishvara is the non-cause of results because, as mentioned above, there is no difference between Ishvara the cause of results and Ishvara the non-cause of results.

GESHE WANGMO: Actually, I could have gone through this very quickly . . . any wrong view we hold, when we see its absurdities, then it becomes easier to let it go and change.